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Abstract— Security is a primary concern for the networks 
aiming at the utilization of Cellular (C) services for connecting 
Vehicles to Everything (V2X). At present, C-V2X is observing 
a paradigm shift from Long Term Evolution (LTE) – Evolved 
Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) to 
Fifth Generation (5G) based functional architecture.  However, 
security and credential management are still concerns to be 
resolved under 5G-V2X. A sizably voluminous number of key 
updates and non-availability of sub-functions at the edge cause 
adscititious overheads and decrement the performance while 
alarming the possibilities of variants of cyber attacks. In this 
paper, security management is studied as a principle of 
sustainability and its tradeoff is evaluated with the number of 
key-updates required to maintain an authenticated connection 
of a vehicle to the 5G-terminals keeping intact the security 
functions at the backhaul. A numerical study is presented to 
determine the claims and understand the proposed tradeoff.  
Keywords—Security, 5G-V2X, Backhaul, Sustainability, 
Key-management. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the availability of new radio access technologies, 
provisioning different types of services across the Cellular-
Vehicle to Everything (C-V2X) is seen as the forefront of 
5G networks [1] [2] [3]. This has been dominatingly termed 
as 5G-V2X where the core security and general functions 
are considered for facilitating the security and services for 
vehicles involved in the formation of the Vehicle to Vehicle 
(V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle to 
Pedestrian (V2P) networks as a part of V2X. Connecting 
fronthaul entities to the network and ensuring much of the 
operations at the edge require specific divisibility 
phenomenon which can simultaneously acquire as well as 
manage the backhaul operations [3] [4].  
   Most of the existing studies have presented this as a 
resource allocation problem [5] [6]. However, there is no 
evident study available which aims at providing a strategic 
management of security for 5G-V2X while considering the 
appropriate security for the backhaul formed between the 
Terminal (TM) and the hub as a part of the basic 
architecture.  The initial reports on 5G have provided a 
specific security function architecture which can be 
integrated with the required base model as well as a security 
protocol to authenticate the devices involved in the 
transmissions [2] [7]. Initially, 5G-Authentication and Key 
Agreement (AKA) protocol and Extensible Authentication 
Protocol (EAP)-AKA prime are seen as competitive 
solutions for authenticating network entities [2]. However, 
the initial reports do not confirm the overheads associated 
with the periodic key updates, mobility management of 
vehicles, as well as the sustainability of V2X against a 
known set of cyber threats [8][9]. Periodic key updates 
undoubtedly enhance the security of a network, but this 
procedure, in the case of limited requirements, causes an 
uncertain burden on the entities and may result in high 
computational complexity as well as high operational cost 
[6] [10]. Thus, this article helps to understand the 
requirements of security management for V2X and also 
considers the possibilities of sub-dividing the 5G security 
functions to make it suitable for handling operations as well 
as authentication procedures of V2X at a high rate of 
sustainability with lesser key-updates. 
  The remaining part of this article is organized as follows: 
Section II presents the problem statement and highlights our 
contribution. Section III discusses the system model. The 
proposed approach is presented in Section IV. Section V 
covers the numerical evaluations. Finally, Section VI 
concludes the article. 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OUR CONTRIBUTION 
Managing security for backhaul-aware 5G-V2X is tedious 
as it depends on the architectural deployment and 5G 
function-mappings to the underlaid network. Moreover, with 
a key focus on edge-initiation, bringing security-aspects 
near to users raise concerns of trustworthy security 
facilitations, especially when the involved entities are 
vehicles. With varying mobility and high dynamics in V2V, 
V2I and V2P formations, management of security needs an 
efficient solution which can protect the network under major 
attack scenarios. In this paper, the key exchange passes 
between the vehicles and 5G-security functions, which are 
deployed on the core, hub and the switches, are considered. 
The article also considers the backhaul between the TM and 
the hub for management as a part of the 5G deployment. 
The primary objective is to identify the time slots when the 
keys should be updated in order to protect the network 
against known cyber threats. Alongside, identification of 
fail-safe points up to which the network can be operated 
with the current keys is to be determined. Credential 
management, and certifying the key-hierarchy principles or 
enabling edge-initiated security are further considered as a 
part of the derived optimization problem. It should be 
considered with an extreme importance that updating keys is 
a crucial part of the network which has to deal with a large 
number of applications. Network with a large number of 
key-updates can be secured up to much extent but at the cost 
of performance. Thus, this tradeoff needs to be balanced for 
attaining an efficient backhaul-aware 5G-V2X. Based on the 
solutions presented in this article, the core contributions can 
be marked as follows: 
 Dual security management solution is presented 
that considers security through long-range and 
short-range authentications. 
 A fail-safe point is identified as a part of the 
optimization solution, until which, the network can 
be operated without changing the derived keys. 
 A new hierarchy principle is presented for 
managing key derivations from the 5G security 
functions.  
 
Fig.1 An illustration of 5G-V2X with mmWave Backhaul between the 
Hub and the terminal based on 5G security and general network functions. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL 
The network comprises 5G security functions which are 
mapped across the core, TMs, switches, User Equipment 
(UE), and hubs, as shown in Fig.1. The UEs involve the 
vehicles and general users that form V2V, V2I and V2P 
links during their operations. The core involves the Access 
and Mobility Management Function (AMF), which operates 
together with the Session Management Function (SMF) and 
Policy Control Function (PCF), and as described in the 
initial TS by 3GPP [2], the Security Anchor Function 
(SEAF) is placed in their periphery which is located deep in 
the network without any knowledge to the edge as well as 
vehicles. As it is tedious to consider such a deployment for 
supporting edge-initiated security as well as authentication 
for V2X, the proposed part modifies it and presents a new 
disintegrated structure to make the 5G-drafted version 
suitable for V2X. SEAF keys and authentication are driven 
by the Authentication Server Function (AUSF) and the 
Authentication Credential Repository and Processing 
Function (ARPF) [2].  
The mmWave backhaul supports the Unified Data 
Management (UDM), Application Function (AF), (Radio) 
Access Network ((R)-AN), and User Plane Function (UPF). 
In accordance with the problem statement, the issue is with 
the security management that involves the V2X 
authentication and TM authentication with the hub along 
with the placement of major details at the edge without 
costing the performance. This article considers security to 
be directly proportional to the number of key-updates 
performed in the V2X setup.  However, with an excessive 
number of updates, the network induces certain overheads, 
which slow down the operations and increase the burden of 
credential management. To resolve this, at first, a timing 
problem is formulated. According to which, let t be the time 
taken by an adversary to launch an attack, out of which t’ be 
the minimum time for which the keys should not be 
changed.  
    Considering this, the key-utilization time, tu, must be 
identified, such that tu < t’ (<=t), for which the currently 
allocated keys can be safe from known attacks. Moreover, 
intermediate-key updates, Uk, should be minimized while 
maximizing the overall sustainability, SN, of the network. 
Here, SN is derived as a function of induced overheads by 
using IPAT formulations [11], such that 
 
𝑆𝑁 =  
𝑛𝑈𝑘
𝐷.𝑃.𝑄
 ,    (1) 
 
where 𝐷 (≤ 𝑁) =  C x, y dx 
𝑟2
𝑟1
is the number of cars in the 
periphery (r) of a particular TM for a given density function 
C(x,y). P is the probability of loss in connectivity; Q is the 
number of passes between the entities, n is the sustainability 
balancing constant depicting the inverse of number of hops 
between the vehicles and the entity dealing with the 
particular request generated for a 5G security function (key 
or service requests), N is the end devices (vehicles, UEs, or 
users), and E is the overall involved entities. Now, based on 
the above-discussed security issues, the optimization 
problem can be formulated as: 
 
max 𝑆𝑁 ∀𝐸,∀𝑁,    (2) 
s.t. 
max  𝑡𝑢 ,∀𝑁, 
 
min 𝑈𝑁 ,    and  UN   ≥ 
in  tradeoff  with  SN  
UN
′ , 
 
0 < 𝐷 ≤ 𝑁, 
 
0 <
𝑛−1(𝑛−1−1)
2
≤
𝐸 𝐸−1  
2
,𝑛−1  ≠ 𝐸,  
 
  min 𝑡𝑢 − 𝑡
′ .       (3) 
 
Here, UN
′  is the mandatory key-updates below which it is 
difficult to evaluate the network for security and perform 
any tasks, such as mobility management, re-authentication.  
 
 
Fig.2 An overview of the security considerations, key generations, long and 
short-range authentication and additional functions derived for managing 
sub-keys. 
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH 
The proposed approach establishes a security management 
framework which operates as a dual security driving system 
based on two modes for authentication-long range 
authentication and short-range authentication. Both these 
help to provide a strong authentication for V2X while 
ensuring the security of backhaul between the TM and the 
hub. The proposed approach maintains a plan for 
authentication via key exchanges that are performed by 
utilizing the deployed 5G security functions. The long-range 
authentications are performed for the backhaul whereas the 
short-range authentications are performed for the edge-
initiated network formations. The initial mode is dependent 
on the derivations of keys from the core, which is a part of 
long-range authentication and sub-division of initial keys 
support the procedures for short-range authentication. The 
long-range authentication is operated over a powerful 
mmWave communications, which can be facilitated by 
existing encryption algorithms and can be motivated to 
update the keys once the devices are deployed or 
reconfigured. However, the major issue prevails at the edge-
initiated authentication for the vehicles, which under high 
dynamics, causes an additional burden of key-regenerations 
as well as credential management. To further resolve this 
issue, a factorized module is considered in the short-range 
authentication, which evaluates the speed (S), location (L), 
last updates for keys (UT), shared sessions (AS), refreshing 
rate of keys (FR), total keys (TK), zone traversals (ZT), and 
associatively (VA) of a vehicle to generate new keys or 
continue with the existing keys while maintaining the 
conditions stated in (2).  An overview of the proposed 
approach with key dependencies is presented in Fig.2 with 
the description as follows: 
 The AMF function is sub-divided into the terminal 
function (TM-F) and Hub function (HM-F) that 
derive their keys from KOTK, which is derived from 
KAMF.  
 The derived keys are used for initial long-range 
authentications and short-range authentications. 
The sub-derived keys are used for authenticating 
vehicles' fronthaul to the edge and the backhaul 
between the TM and the hub. 
 The sub-derivative functions help to support the 
intra- and inter-mode of secure communications in 
V2X by deriving their core operations from the 5G 
security functions. 
At present, the details of internal procedures for the 
proposed framework and authentication mechanisms are 
omitted from the article and prime focus has been given to 
understand the sustainability of the backhaul-aware 5G-V2X 
under the given constraints of key updates. These can 
further be observed from the following results: 
 
Lemma-1: SN is divergent if the initial information on the 
key generation is unavailable. However, in the case of 
known timestamps, the network sustainability can be 
modeled over the available key updates and vehicle 
movement, such that for instances t1 and t2: 
𝑆𝑁 =  
𝛼2
2𝛽𝑁  1 −
𝑛−1
𝐸  
𝑁
𝑄
  𝐸𝑖  
𝛽 − 𝛼
𝑡1
 − 𝐸𝑖  
𝛽 − 𝛼
𝑡2
  , 
     (4) 
at t2 - t1 > 0, E - n
-1
 > 0, 𝛽 − 𝛼 > 0, and Ei is the exponential 
integral. 
Proof: Considering (1) to be following Poisson distribution 
for vehicles approaching at a rate of 𝛽 vehicles per unit time 
and operating with 𝛼 number of key-updates per unit time, 
𝑈𝑘  can be given by𝑒
−
𝛼
𝑡
 
𝛼
𝑡
 
𝑋
𝑋!
, (X=2), as only 2 keys are used 
for authentication (long range and short range keys) and D 
can be written as  𝑒−
𝛽
𝑡
 
𝛽
𝑡
 
𝑋 ′
𝑋′!
 , (X’=1), as each vehicle 
maintains its connectivity with one source from the network. 
Now, considering the involved entities in the network for 
authenticating a vehicle, and using the model in [12], the 
probability of no connectivity (P) can be given as  1 −
𝑛−1
𝐸
 
𝑁
. The number of passes remains at the discretion of the 
used protocol and is constant for this evaluation. By using 
these values in (1) and under fixed interval, the observed 
equation can be written as: 
𝑆𝑁 =  
1
𝑁 1−
𝑛−1
𝐸
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𝑄
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𝛼
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        (5) 
On solving, at t2-t1>0, E-n
-1
 >0, 𝛽 − 𝛼>0, the observation is   
𝑆𝑁 =  
𝛼2
2𝛽𝑁 1−
𝑛−1
𝐸
 
𝑁
𝑄
  𝐸𝑖  
𝛽−𝛼
𝑡1
 − 𝐸𝑖  
𝛽−𝛼
𝑡2
  , 
               (6) 
which is the desired output.  
 
Lemma-2: For extreme large rates of key exchanges and 
vehicle dynamics, SN is convergent to a linear function under 
asymptotic observations. This can be further used to identify 
fail-safe points with high accuracy up to which the network 
can be operated without much overheads and security 
breaches. 
Proof: In continuation from Lemma-1, the result in (6) can 
be asymptotically analyzed for evaluating the behavior of 
the curve determining the sustainability of the V2X under 
given constraints. According to which, if 𝛼 and 𝛽 increases 
to a larger value, the (6) reduces to a linear function, such 
that SN can be evaluated as a function comprising two 
metrics, i.e. 𝑆𝑁 = 𝑓  
𝛼
𝑡
,
𝛽
𝑡
 ; and by following strict principles 
and limits, it can be given as 𝑆𝑁 =
𝛼
𝛽
. Moreover, in such a 
case, the behavior is not integrally divergent and the 
network can be evaluated with linear timestamping. Now, 
considering these observations, the network fail-safe points 
up to which there is no need to update or refresh the keys 
can be evaluated as: 
𝐹𝑆 =  
𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑆𝑁 ≥  𝑆𝑁
𝑇𝐻 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑡1 ≠ 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛 
𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑂 ≤  𝑀𝑂
𝑇𝐻 ,𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
.  
      (7) 
Here, MO is the message overhead evaluated as 
𝑀𝑂 =
𝑂𝑆  1−𝑃 
𝐸 .𝑃
,            (8) 
where OS is said to be increasing exponentially. This is due 
to the reason that the key updates and vehicles follow the 
Poisson distribution with randomness observable from 
Lemma-1, based on which, Os can be modeled as  𝑂𝑏  (1 −
𝛼
𝑡
)𝑡 , where Ob is the overheads for initial authentication. 
This can be predicted between the instances, as shown in 
Lemma-1, only at a fixed number of updates (𝛼 ′ =  
𝛼
𝑡
), such 
that 
𝑂𝑆 =
𝑂𝑏 
𝑛−1
𝐸
 
𝑁
 
𝐸  1−
𝑛−1
𝐸
 
𝑁 .
ln (1−𝛼 ′)t2−ln (1−𝛼 ′)t1  
ln (1−𝛼 ′)
. (9)  
These observations are required to determine the exactness 
of updates for the available values of sustainability as well 
as message overheads. The thresholds are identified based 
on the data pool available for the time required to launch an 
attack particularly on the protocol used for the 
authentication of vehicles to everything or TM to the hub. 
 Table 1. Parameter Settings 
Metrics Values Metrics Values 
β 2-10 (step 2) (A1-A5) n-1 5 
α β/2 Q 1-5 
N 10 t1 5 s 
E 1-10 t2 105 s 
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS 
Security of backhaul-aware 5G-V2X cannot be quantified 
and it depends on the operations of the involved 
authentication protocol, which will be presented in our 
future reports. However, the timing to update keys and 
managing security based on the arrival rate of vehicles is 
quantifiable and it can be observed in the form of 
sustainability as expressed in the earlier part of this article. 
To further understand the impact of metrics on the 
sustainability and the location of fail-safe points, a 
numerical case study is conducted by using metrics defined 
in Table 1. The values are based on a general setup 
described in the initial parts of this article and other metrics 
are assumed within the constraints of Lemma-1 and Lemma-
2. The result is recorded for SN, as shown in Fig.3. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Network sustainability w.r.t. the number of protocol passes at 
different rates for incoming vehicles and the number of key updates.  
 
The results suggest that with the proposed strategy, it is 
feasible to effectively trace the network activity and manage 
its security by keeping a check on unnecessary key updates. 
By this, significant overheads can be reduced from the 
network and the security can be provided at the edge while 
keeping a close associatively with the network-backhaul. It 
is observed that the number of passes and key-updates used 
for authentication pose a significant impact on the 
performance as well as the security of the network. 
Numerically, the results vary between 53.1% and 84.9% 
compared to initial observed output at constant arrival and 
update rates for vehicles and keys, respectively, with a 
varying value of Q. It is evident that the sustainability of the 
network can be enhanced even with an increase in the 
number of vehicles or key-updates by reducing the number 
of passes between the vehicle and the infrastructure. Thus, it 
is important to carefully select the authentication protocol 
and it must not cause excessive signaling overheads. For 
this, the proposed approach leverages on the divisibility of 
5G security functions based on the requirements at the 
specific edge leading to the formations of TM-F and HM-F, 
which help to effectively manage the security in a backhaul-
aware 5G-V2X. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this article, a tradeoff between the sustainability and the 
number of key-updates is managed in a backhaul-aware 5G-
V2X. A security management framework is proposed which 
considers security through long- and short-range 
authentications. Analytical evaluations are presented to 
study the impact of key-exchanges, the arrival rate of 
vehicles and the number of authentication passes on the 
sustainability of the network. Following which a fail-safe 
point is identified as a part of the optimization solution. To 
generalize, new functions are derived to handle the 
conceptualization of the proposed solution. 
This is an incremental article and further information on 
the authentication procedures, key-exchanges, and 
operational details will be presented in our future reports. 
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